Higher-order risk attitudes other than risk aversion (e.g., prudence and temperance) play vital roles both in theoretical and empirical work. While the literature has mainly focused on how they entail a preference for combining "good" outcomes with "bad" outcomes, We consider here an alternative approach which relates higher-order risk attitudes to the sign of correlation. The theoretical result in this paper proposes new insights into economic and financial applications such as risk aversion in the presence of another risk, bivariate stochastic dominance and justifying the first-order approach to moral hazard principal-agent problems.
Introduction
Covariance is perhaps the most common notion of dependence between two random variables.
Consider two random variablesx andỹ valued in the intervals [a, b] and [c, d] respectively. It is well known that one of the most used formula in the economics of uncertainty is the covariance rule:
which implies that Exỹ ≥ ExEỹ if and only ifx andỹ co-vary positively.
A direct application of above covariance rule is to sign the equity premium: Denote u as the bivariate utility of the representative agent,x as the GDP per capita andỹ as the background risk. From Gollier (2001, page 65-68) , we know that the equity premium, φ, can be written as 1 :
If there is full information on the agent's preference (e.g., u(x, y) = log(x + y)) and the distribution of (x,ỹ) (e.g., (x,ỹ) is joint-normal distributed), then we can simply sign φ. Generally, however, we have only partial information on preferences (e.g., risk aversion) and distributions of random variables (e.g., affiliation). The rules of covariance between functions employ partial information on the agent's preferences and the random variables and, therefore, they sign the correlation. We recall a well-developed concept for covariance between monotonic functions.
Definition (Esary et al. 1967 ) (x,ỹ) is said to be associated if for all functions α, β which are increasing in each component, Cov(α(x,ỹ), β(x,ỹ) ) ≥ 0.
Suppose that all that we know is that the agent risk averse in x (u (2,0) < 0) and correlation averse (u (1,1) ≤ 0) 2 , then the above definition and (2) imply that , the equity premium, φ, is positive when (x,ỹ) is associated. Thus, we have partial information on the sign of the equity premium.
Recently, prudence and temperance, as well as even higher-order risk attitudes, have become important both in theoretical and empirical work. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) u(x, y). 2 For the interpretation of correlation averse, please see Richard (1975) , Epstein and Tanny (1980), Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) . these higher-order risk attitudes toward particular classes of lottery pairs. They show how higher-order risk attitudes can be fully characterized by a preference relation over these lotteries.
They call such preference as "risk apportionment" and show that, if preferences are defined in an expected utility framework with differentiable utility, the direction of preference for a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the higher-order derivative of the utility function. Since then, the concept of "risk apportionment" has been extended by Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) , Winkler (2009), Jokung (2011) and to higher orders of multivariate risk attitudes. Eeckhoudt (2012) and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2012) provide excellent surveys on this line of research.
The agents with higher-order risk attitudes might be somewhat similar when they sign the correlation of their utility functions with some types of random variables. However, there is relatively little theory on how to sign covariance between functions beyond monotonicity. This paper concentrates on covariance rule that can be applied to higher-order risk attitudes.
Although association is one of the basic conditions that describe positive dependence, when we sign correlation, finding other conditions of dependence which are weaker than association is still useful. Generally speaking, as we shall see in this paper, the more information we know for the agent's preference, the weaker dependence of random variables we need to sign covariance.
We start by building a theory of covariance between functions with higher-order derivatives.
Then there are three applications to illustrate it, including risk aversion in the presence of another risk, bivariate stochastic orderings and justifying the first-order approach to moral hazard principal-agent problems.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 proposes a covariance rule between functions with higher-order derivatives. Section 3 contains three applications of the covariance rule in an expected-utility framework. Section 4 concludes the paper. Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) propose a positive dependence concept to study the demand for insurance in the presence of a background risk: The distribution of background risk conditional upon a given level of insurable loss deteriorates in the sense of third-order stochastic dominance as the amount of insurable loss increases. Denote by F (y|x) the conditional distribution of ỹ givenx = x. The following dependent structure extends Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) 's concept to N th -order stochastic dominance.
A Sign for Covariance of functions with higher-order derivatives
F SDD(ỹ|x) (N=1) states that x increasesỹ via first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). SSDD(ỹ|x) (N=2) means that x increasesỹ via second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) which includes a "mean-preserving increase in risk" as defined by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . T SDD(ỹ|x) (N=3) implies that x increasesỹ via third-order stochastic dominance (TSD). Combing any SSD shift with any "increase in downside risk" as defined by Menezes et al. (1980) yields a TSD. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) explain how the different metrics in the extant empirical literature can be put into a stochastic dominance framework. Now we are going to sign Cov(α(x,ỹ), β(x,ỹ) ) by N th SDD(ỹ|x) and the signs of higherorder partial derivatives of α and β. Denuit et al. (1999) 
for all α and β such that
(ii) N th SDD(ỹ|x) where N = min(I, J).
Whenx is the wealth,ỹ is another risk that cannot be hedged and β(x, y) = u(x, y) is the agent's utility function, Cov (x, u(x,ỹ) ) ≥ 0 implies wealth and utility go in the same direction.
For example, Proposition 2.1 shows that: (i) when (x,ỹ) is F SDD(ỹ|x), for a monotonic agent (iii) T SDD(ỹ|x), the agent is risk aversion in x, correlation averse, cross-prudent and cross-
. For more discussions of correlation averse, cross-prudent and cross-temperate, please see Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) .
To close this section, we note that Proposition 2.1 also adds knowledge of comparing stochastic dependence structures. From Proposition 2.1 and the definition of association, we know that "(x,ỹ) is associated" implies N th SDD(ỹ|x). Proposition 2.1 can also help us to show that N th SDD(ỹ|x) implies "x is positive N th ED onỹ" (The discussion of the relationship between N th SDD(ỹ|x) and N th ED is given in Appendix). Now we can state formally the relationships between the various concepts of bivariate dependence:
⇒x is positive N th ED onỹ
Some economic consequences
This part of the paper demonstrates the usefulness of Proposition 2.1 for economic and financial applications such as risk aversion in the presence of another risk, bivariate stochastic dominance and justifying the first-order approach to moral hazard principal-agent problems.
Risk aversion in the presence of another risk
An agent is risk averse if she prefers the expected value of a random amount of money than the random amount of money. Finkelshtain et al. (1999) study the question of risk aversion in the presence of background risks in other argument of the utility function. They propose the following result 3 ;
Theorem 3.1 (Finkelshtain et al. 1999, part (a) and (b) of Theorem 2) The following statements are equivalent.
Proposition 2.1 can extend risk aversion in the presence of background risks to higher-order risk attitudes. We propose the following result. In the following two examples we will apply Proposition 3.2 to optimal of savings and health investments problems studied by Denuit et al. (2011) . The applications consider an agent facing a financial risk in the presence of a non-hedged background risk such as health or environmental risk. A decision has to be made about the amount of an investment (in the financial dimension) resulting in a future benefit either in the same dimension (savings) or in the other dimension Example The agent's objective is to select the optimal amount of savings (s) to be transferred from period 0 to period 1. The choice s is made in order to maximize total utility U defined as
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and r is the rate of return. The optimal amount of savings s * is determined by
Define s x,E as the solution of (8) with (x, Eh) substituted for (x,h), and s E,h as the solution of (8) with (Ex,h) substituted for (x,h). Proposition 3.2 implies the following result.
Proof See appendix. Q.E.D.
The above proposition proposes the stochastic dependence structures between the two risks and higher-risk attitudes which imply the increase of optimal amount of savings.
Example The agent chooses how much of resources x 0 is to be devoted to an investment a that will improve his future health by an amount ma, where m represents the productivity of the current monetary sacrifice expressed in units of the other attribute. The choice a is made in order to maximize total utility V defined as
The optimal amount of investment a * is determined by
Define a x,E as the solution of (10) with (x, Eh) substituted for (x,h), and a E,h as the solution of (10) with (Ex,h) substituted for (x,h).
Proposition 3.4 (i) u
Proposition 3.4 shows under which conditions optimal investment for health (environmental) improvement is reached.
A class of bivariate stochastic orderings
Stochastic dominance is a very useful tool in various areas of economics and finance. It has been studied extensively in the univariate case (e.g. Hadar Russell (1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969) ). extend the univariate case to multivariate N th -degree concave (convex) stochastic dominance and N th -degree risk. In this section we use a stochastic order that can be related to characteristics such as higher-order risk attitudes. We study bivariate stochastic dominance for this stochastic order.
Let (x 1 ,ỹ 1 ) and (x 2 ,ỹ 2 ) be two 2-dimensional random vectors with density functions f and
we have the following conclusion: If (x 2 ,ỹ 2 ) is associated and f g is increasing in x and y, then We can apply Proposition 2.1 to (11) to get: Proposition 3.5 The following statements are equivalent.
The advantage of above the proposition is that it extends the bivariate stochastic ordering from associated random variables to N th SDD random variables, while the cost is that it requires more restrictions on the higher-order partial derivatives of u and f g . For example, when I = J = 2, Proposition 3.5 implies that, Eu(
and u (0,1) ≥ 0) and risk averse in y (u (0,2) ≤ 0), f g is increasing in x and y, concave in y, and SSDD(ỹ|x).
In the following two examples, we re-examine the optimal of savings and health investments problems again by Proposition 3.5. We suppose f and g are density functions of (x,h) and
Example We consider (7) again. Define s ′ as the solution of (8) with (x ′ ,h ′ ) substituted for (x,h). Proposition 3.5 implies the following result.
Example We consider (9) again. Define a ′ as the solution of (10) with (x ′ ,h ′ ) substituted for (x,h). We obtain the following result from Proposition 3.5.
The above two examples demonstrate the usefulness of Proposition 3.5 for deriving comparative static effects of changes of risk.
Justify the first-order approach to bi-signal principal-agent problems
Suppose an agent chooses an effort level a ≥ 0, and she has a von NeumannVMorgenstern utility function u(s)−a, where s is the agents monetary payoff and u(.) is a strictly increasing function. Let s = s(x, y) be the function, chosen by the principal, specifying her payment to the agent as a function of the signal (x,ỹ) with probability density function f (x, y|a). The agents expected payoff is
It is well known that, one way to guarantee that the First-order-approach (FOA) is valid is to show that the U (a) is concave, given the wage contract. The sufficient conditions for this requirement are the monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC) and the concavity of the distribution function condition (CDFC) (Rogerson, 1985) . However, most of the distribution functions do not have the CDFC property.
Jewitt (see Conlon 2009 p274-275 ) has suggested another sufficient conditions for the concavity of U (a). Define H(x, y) = u(s(x, y)). We can obtain (Conlon 2009, 274-275) :
which implies that, "(x,ỹ) is affiliated, H(x, y) and − faa (x,y|a) f (x,y|a) are increasing functions" are sufficient conditions for
Applying Proposition 2.1 to (13), we can propose a sufficient and necessary condition for the concavity of U (a).
Proposition 3.8
The following statements are equivalent.
for all H(x, y) and f (x, y|a) such that
Proposition 3.8 extends our knowledge of the validity of the FOA in the principal-agent problems from affiliated bi-signal to N th SDD bi-signal.
Conclusion
The rule of covariance has been widely studied in the monotonic functions case. The monotonic functions are consistent with some basic preference conditions such as monotonicity. However, many higher-order risk attitudes, that are easy to explain to decision makers, are beyond the monotonic functions. This paper fills this gap by linking higher-order risk attitudes to the sign of correlation. We present some economic and financial applications that are useful in applying the result.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2.1
(ii) ⇒ (i): From Esary et al. (1967 , we know that
= E{Cov [α(x,ỹ), β(x,ỹ) 
α (0,1) ≥ 0 and β (0,1) ≥ 0 imply Cov [α(x,ỹ), β(x,ỹ) ] ≥ 0, and hence E{Cov [α(x,ỹ), β(x,ỹ) and dE[β(x,ỹ) 
Then, applying integration by parts to
and hence
By the same approach we can show that,
Finally, we can conclude that, N th SDD(ỹ|x) where N = min(I, J), imply (17).
(i) ⇒ (ii): We prove this by contradictions.
Suppose that F N (y|x 2 ) > F N (y|x 1 ) for x 2 ≥ x 1 . Due to the continuity of F N (y|x), we have
. Choose the following function: ..., N . From (18) and (19) we get
and hence, form (16), we obtain
= E{Cov [x,β(x,ỹ) 
which is a contradiction. Now suppose F j (d|x 2 ) > F j (d|x 1 ) for x 2 > x 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1. Due to the continuity of
. Choose the following function:
and (−1)
and hence, (−1) kβ(0,k−1) (x, y) ≥ 0 and
Therefore, (18) and (19) we get
which is a contradiction.
Various concepts of bivariate dependence
The expectation dependence concept is introduced by Wright (1987) . Li (2011) proposes the higher-order extensions. The definition is recalled next. Define
thenx is positive first-degree expectation dependent onỹ. Define ED 2 (x|y) = 
thenx is positive N th -order expectation dependent (N th ED) onỹ.
Expectation dependence and its higher-order extensions have been shown to play a key role in many economic and financial problems, such as asset allocation (Wright, 1987; Hadar and Seo, 1988) , demand for risky asset under background risk (Li, 2011) , first-order risk aversion Li 2011, 2013) and asset pricing . It is interesting to find the relationship between N th SDD(ỹ|x) and ED N (x|y). Denuit et al. (2013, Equation (19) (Wright, 1987; Hadar and Seo, 1988; Li, 2011; Dionne and Li 2011; still hold.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
We are going to use an approach motivated by Bulinski and Shashkin (2007 we obtain E [u(x,ỹ) − u(Ex,ỹ) ] ≤ 0.
